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Abstract
We consider 2-player zero-sum stochastic games where each player controls his own state
variable living in a compact metric space. The terminology comes from gambling problems
where the state of a player represents its wealth in a casino. Under standard assumptions
(e.g. continuous running payoff and non-expansive transitions), we consider for each discount
factor the value vλ of the λ-discounted stochastic game and investigate its limit when λ goes
to 0. We show that under a new acyclicity condition, the limit exists and is characterized as
the unique solution of a system of functional equations: the limit is the unique continuous
excessive and depressive function such that each player, if his opponent does not move, can
reach the zone when the current payoff is at least as good as the limit value, without degrading
the limit value. The approach generalizes and provides a new viewpoint on the Mertens-Zamir
system coming from the study of zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both
sides. A counterexample shows that under a slightly weaker notion of acyclicity, convergence
of (vλ) may fail.
Keywords: Zero-Sum Stochastic Games, Markov Decision Process, Asymptotic
and Uniform Value, Gambling Theory, Mertens-Zamir System, Splitting Games
Classification: Primary: 91A15, 91A60 ; secondary: 60G40; 90C40
1 Introduction
The model of zero-sum stochastic games was introduced by Shapley [Shapley, 1953].
A state variable ω ∈ Ω follows a controlled Markov chain with transitions Q(ω˜|i, j, ω)
controlled by the actions of two competing players (i ∈ I for player 1 and j ∈ J
for player 2). Shapley assumed the action and state spaces (I, J and Ω) to be finite
and proved the existence of the value vλ of the λ-discounted game using a dynamic
programming principle, and characterized vλ as the unique fixed point of what has
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been called the Shapley operator [Rosenberg and Sorin, 2001] and [Sorin, 2002]. For a
recent survey, see [Laraki and Sorin, 2014].
Bewley and Kohlberg [Bewley and Kohlberg, 1976] using algebraic tools, proved the
existence of the asymptotic value v = limλ→0vλ. Actually, when action and state spaces
are finite, the equations that define vλ may be described by finitely many polynomial
inequalities, implying that vλ is semi-algebraic and so is converging. The extension
of this result to infinite stochastic games is a central question in mathematical game
theory (see [Mertens et al., 2015], [Sorin and Neyman, 2003] and [Sorin, 2002]).
Recently, several important conjectures (see [Mertens, 1986], [Mertens et al., 2015])
were proved to be false. Vigeral [Vigeral, 2013] and Ziliotto [Ziliotto, 2016a] provided
examples where the family {vλ} diverges as λ approaches zero. In Vigeral, the state
space Ω is finite and the action sets I and J are semi-algebraic. In Ziliotto, the set
of actions is finite but the state space Ω is compact, and can be seen as the space of
common beliefs on a finite state variable, controlled but not observed by the players.
On the other hand, there are many classes of stochastic games with general state
space and action sets where {vλ} converges. Many have in common some irreversibility
in the transitions. In recursive games [Everett, 1957, Sorin and Vigeral, 2013] the cur-
rent payoff is zero until the game is absorbed. In absorbing games ([Kohlberg, 1974]
[Mertens et al., 2009] and [Rosenberg and Sorin, 2001]) there is only one non-absorbing
state. In repeated games with incomplete information (see [Aumann et al., 1995],
[Mertens and Zamir, 1971] and [Rosenberg and Sorin, 2001]) once a player reveals some
information, he cannot withdraw it. Similarly in splitting games ([Laraki, 2001b],
[Laraki, 2001a] and [Sorin, 2002]) the state follows a martingale which eventually con-
verges. This leads many to anticipate that irreversibility has to do with convergence.
Interestingly, in all those classes of “irreversible” stochastic games, not only we have
convergence but also a characterization of the asymptotic value.
Our paper provides a weak and a strong definition of irreversibility (we call acyclic-
ity) and prove that they constitute the frontier between convergence and divergence of
{vλ}: strong acyclicity guarantees convergence while the closely related weak acyclic-
ity does not. To do so, we restrict ourself to a new class which embeds any product
stochastic game [Flesch et al., 2008] and naturally extends gambling houses from one
to two players.
A classical gambling house problem has three ingredients : a metric state space
S, a Borel-measurable utility function u : S → IR, and a gambling house Φ, where
Φ is a set value function that assigns to each s ∈ S a set Φ(s) in ∆(S) (set of Borel
probability distributions over S). At each stage t, given the state st, the decision
maker gets the reward u(st), chooses pt ∈ Φ(st), and the state moves to st+1 accord-
ing to the probability distribution pt. The gambling house is called leavable if for
every s ∈ S, δs (the dirac mass at s) belongs to Φ(s). This model was introduced
in [Dubins and Savage, 1965], and was studied extensively by several authors, for in-
stance [Maitra and Sudderth, 1996]. It is well known that any MDP (Markov Decision
Process) can be mapped to a gambling house (by encoding actions in the state space)
and any positive MDP can be mapped to a leavable gambling house, see for instance
[Dubins et al., 2002], [Maitra and Sudderth, 1996] and [Schal, 1989].
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In a gambling game, each player controls his gambling house: Γ : X → ∆(X)
for Player 1 and Λ : Y → ∆(Y ) for Player 2, and the utility function is now u :
X × Y → IR with the convention that player 1 wants to maximize u whereas player
2 wants to minimize u. At each stage t, both players knowing the state ωt = (xt, yt),
simultaneously Player 1 chooses pt in Γ(xt) and Player 2 chooses qt ∈ Λ(yt), the stage
payoff is u(xt, yt) and a new state (xt+1, yt+1) is selected according to the probability
distribution pt⊗ qt. As for MDP, any product stochastic game [Flesch et al., 2008] can
be mapped to a gambling game.
For each λ ∈ (0, 1], one can define the λ-discounted game where the stream of
payoffs is evaluated according to
∑
t=1 λ(1− λ)t−1u(xt, yt). In economics, λ is usually
called the discount rate, whereas 1− λ = 1
1+r
= δ is called the discount factor and r is
the interest rate. Hence, λ small means the player is patient and long-term optimizing.
Under some classical regularity assumptions, the λ-discounted game will have a
value vλ and the family {vλ} will be equi-continuous. The central questions this paper
is concerned with are: when does limλ→0vλ exist and if so, how to characterize it from
the data of the game. A characterization is important if one wants to compute the limit
value. This is a difficult question that this paper will not address. Let us just mention
that computing the convex envelope of a given function, a very special case of our
characterization, is already an NP-hard problem and there are, to our knowledge, only
few algorithms that approximate it (see for instance [Laraki and J.B-Lasserre, 2008]).
Our first main result shows that if at least one of the gambling houses Γ or Λ is
strongly acyclic (definition 2.14), {vλ} uniformly converges to a function v as λ goes to
0. Moreover, we provide several characterizations of the asymptotic value v that extend
the well known Mertens-Zamir system of functional equations [Mertens and Zamir, 1971].
The convergence of the discounted values to the solution of the Mertens-Zamir system
of equations in the special case of the splitting games was first proved in [Laraki, 2001a]
and [Laraki, 2001b].
Our second result proves that under a slightly weaker notion of acyclicity, {vλ} may
diverge (even if both houses Γ and Λ are weakly acyclic and both state spaces X and
Y are finite). The example has similarities with an example in Ziliotto [Ziliotto, 2016a]
for stochastic games where both players control the same state variable. Our example
is the first in the class of product stochastic games, and is somehow simpler than the
recent counterexamples.
Finally –in the appendix– under an idempotent assumption combined with a bounded
variation hypothesis on the transitions, we prove existence of the uniform value1 and
provide simple uniform optimal strategies, extending a recent result in [Oliu-Barton, 2018]
for the splitting game.
1Recall that when a uniform optimal strategy σ exists, this means that for every ε > 0, there is
λ0 > 0 such that σ is ε-optimal in all λ-discounted games as soon as 0 < λ < λ0, i.e. a player needs
not to know the exact value of the discount factor to play well, but only that it is small enough. In
the MDP literature this property is called Blackwell ε-optimality. This is a very desirable robustness
property.
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2 Gambling Games
2.1 Notations
Given a compact metric space S, we denote by B(S), resp. by C(S), the set of bounded
measurable, resp. continuous, functions from S to the reals, and by ∆(S) the set of
Borel probabilities over S. For s in S, we denote by δs ∈ ∆(S) the Dirac measure on s,
and whenever possible we assimilate s and δs. For v in B(S), we denote by v˜ its affine
extension to ∆(S): v˜(p) = IEp(v) for all p in ∆(S), where IEp(v) :=
∫
S
v(s)dp(s) is the
expectation of v with respect to p. When there is no confusion, v˜(p) will also be denoted
by v(p). Finally, ∆(S) is endowed with the weak-* topology, a compatible distance
being the Kantorovich-Rubinstein (also called the Wasserstein of order 1) metric.
Definition 2.1. For p, p′ in ∆(S), dKR(p, p′) = supv∈E1 |v˜(p)− v˜(p′)|, where E1 is the
set of 1-Lipschitz functions on S.
Observe that when p = δx and p
′ = δx′ are Dirac measures, then dKR(p, p′) =
d(x, x′), the metric distance between x and x′.
2.2 Model and examples
A gambling game is a zero-sum stochastic game where each player controls his own
state variable. We will always assume in this paper that the state spaces are non empty
metric and compact, and denote by X and Y the respective set of states2 controlled
by Player 1 and by Player 2. The transitions of Player 1 are given by a continuous3
multifunction Γ : X ⇒ ∆(X) with non empty convex4 compact values: if the state
of Player 1 is at x, he can select his new state according to any probability in Γ(x).
Similarly, a continuous multifunction Λ : Y ⇒ ∆(Y ) with non empty convex compact
values, gives the transitions of Player 2. The players independently control their own
state, and only interact through payoffs: the running payoff of Player 1 is given by a
continuous mapping u : X × Y −→ IR, and the payoff to Player 2 is given by −u.
Gambling games extend the model of gambling houses [Dubins and Savage, 1965],
which correspond to the single player case when Y is a singleton and Player 2 plays
no role. It is well known that, by an adequate augmentation of the state space in
order to encompass actions, any MDP can be mapped into a gambling house (see
[Dubins et al., 2002], [Maitra and Sudderth, 1996] and [Schal, 1989]).
A standard gambling house is the red-and-black casino where X = [0, 1] is a fortune
space. Suppose that at each fortune x ≥ 0, the gambler can stake any amount s in her
possession. The gambler loses the stake with probability 1−w where w ∈ (0, 1) is fixed
2Both metrics are denoted by d, and we will use the metric d((x, y), (x′, y′)) = d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)
on X × Y .
3i.e. ∀ε > 0,∃α > 0,∀x, x′ ∈ X with d(x, x′) ≤ α,∀p ∈ Γ(x),∃p′ ∈ Γ(x′) s.t. dKR(p, p′) ≤ ε. Since
Γ has compact values, it implies that the graph of Γ is compact.
4If originally the gambling game has non convex values, then allowing as usual players to randomize,
would lead to transitions with convex values.
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and given, and wins back the stake and an additional equal amount with probability
w. The corresponding transition multifunction reads:
Φw(x) = {wδmin{x+s,1} + (1− w)δx−s : 0 ≤ s ≤ x}.
More generally, a casino is a gambling house Γ on X = [0,+∞) in which “a rich
gambler can do whatever a poor one can do” and a “poor gambler can, on a small scale,
imitate a rich one.” Formally, for x ∈ X, let Θ(x) := {θ ∈ ∆(R) : ∃γ ∈ Γ(x) such that
γ = [θ + x]} where [aθ + b] for some reals a and b is the probability measure s.t. for
all u ∈ B(X), ∫
y∈X u(y)d[aθ + b](y) =
∫
y∈X u(ay + b)dθ(y). With those notations, the
gambling house Γ is a casino if for all x ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, [tΘ(x)] ⊂ Θ(tx) ⊂ Θ(x). A
fundamental result of Dubins and Savage (1965) is the classification of casinos into four
types: trivial, subfair, fair, and superfair. Here we need only to distinguish superfair
casinos from those that are not superfair. A casino is superfair if there is θ ∈ Θ(x) for
some x > 0 such that
∫
X
xdθ(x) > 0. The red-and-black casino is superfair if and only
if w > 1
2
. Observe that a Casino is superfair if the player has a strategy that wins in
expectation against the Casino for at least one x > 0 (and so for every x > 0 given the
definition of a casino).
Another class of gambling houses are splitting problems where X = ∆(K) is a
simplex (K is a finite set) and Γ(x) is the set of Borel probabilities σ on X cen-
tered at x (for example σ =
∑n
i=1 αiδxi where x =
∑n
i=1 αixi). The idea of splitting
was introduced by Aumann and Maschler [Aumann et al., 1995] in the context of re-
peated games with incomplete information on one side. This “gambling house” type
of problems is now very popular in the persuasion and information design literature,
see [Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011].
The above two gambling houses naturally extend to gambling games. One can con-
sider a casino game where each player i controls a red-and-black house with parameter
wi, and the running payoff depends on the current pair of fortunes. Another example is
a splitting game introduced in [Laraki, 2001b], [Laraki, 2001a], and [Sorin, 2002] where
X = ∆(K) and Y = ∆(L) are simplexes, Γ(x) is the set of Borel probability measures
on X that are centered at x and Λ(y) is the set of Borel probability measures on Y
that are centered at y.
2.3 Discounted Evaluations
Given a discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1] and an initial state (x1, y1) in X × Y , the game
Gλ(x1, y1) is played as follows: at any stage t ≥ 1, the payoff to Player 1 is u(xt, yt)
and both players knowing (xt, yt), simultaneously Player 1 chooses pt+1 in Γ(xt) and
Player 2 chooses qt+1 in Λ(yt). Then, xt+1 and yt+1 are independently selected according
to pt+1 and qt+1, the new states xt+1 and yt+1 are publicly announced, and the play goes
to stage t+ 1. Under our assumptions of compact state spaces, continuous transitions
with convex compact values and continuous running payoff, it is easy to describe the
value of such dynamic game.
5
Definition 2.2. vλ is the unique element of C(X × Y ) s.t. ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y,
vλ(x, y) = max
p∈Γ(x)
min
q∈Λ(y)
(λu(x, y) + (1− λ)v˜λ(p, q)) ,
= min
q∈Λ(y)
max
p∈Γ(x)
(λu(x, y) + (1− λ)v˜λ(p, q)) .
This is the standard characterization of the value of a discounted game by means of the
Shapley operator (dynamic programing principle for games). Existence and uniqueness
of vλ follow from standard fixed-point arguments (see for instance [Mertens et al., 2015],
[Rosenberg and Sorin, 2001]). We denote by vλ(x, y) the value of the game Gλ(x, y).
The goal of the paper is to study the convergence of (vλ)λ when λ goes to 0, i.e.
when players become more and more patient.
Remark 2.3. Cesaro Evaluations. It is also standard to define the value of the n-stage
games by: v1 = u, and for n ≥ 1 and (x, y) ∈ X × Y :
vn+1(x, y) =
1
n+ 1
max
p∈Γ(x)
min
q∈Λ(y)
(u(x, y) + nv˜n(p, q)) ,
=
1
n+ 1
min
q∈Λ(y)
max
p∈Γ(x)
(u(x, y) + nv˜n(p, q)) .
It is known that the uniform convergence of (vn)n when n goes to infinity, is equivalent
to the uniform convergence of (vλ)λ when λ goes to 0, and in case of convergence both
limits are the same (Theorem 2.2 in [Ziliotto, 2016b] applies here).
2.4 Non-expansive transitions
Without further assumptions, convergence of (vλ) may fail even in the simple case
where Γ and Λ are single-valued (“0 player case”, players have no choice), so we will
assume throughout the paper that the gambling game is non-expansive, i.e. have non-
expansive transitions.
Definition 2.4. The game has non-expansive transitions if:
∀x ∈ X, ∀x′ ∈ X, ∀p ∈ Γ(x),∃p′ ∈ Γ(x′), s.t. dKR(p, p′) ≤ d(x, x′),
and similarly : ∀y ∈ Y, ∀y′ ∈ Y, ∀q ∈ Λ(y),∃q′ ∈ Λ(y′), s.t. dKR(q, q′) ≤ d(y, y′).
The gambling game has non-expansive transitions if the transitions, viewed as map-
pings from X to 2∆(X), and from Y to 2∆(Y ), are 1-Lipschitz for the Hausdorff distance
on compact subsets of ∆(X) and ∆(Y ). Also, when the transitions are determinis-
tic (Dirac measures), we recover the standard definition of non-expansiveness in that
case. Note that, with an adequate choice of the metric, the transitions are always
non-expansive when X and Y are finite5. Moreover splitting games are non-expansive
5If X is finite and d(x, x′) = 2 for x 6= x′, then dKR(p, p′) = ‖p− p′‖1 for p, p′ in ∆(X).
6
[Laraki, 2001b], and red-and-black casino houses with parameter w are non-expansive
if and only if w ≤ 1
2
. More generally, a casino is non-expansive if and only if it is not
superfair [Laraki and Sudderth, 2004].
Let us mention also Markov chain repeated games with incomplete information
where each player observes a private and exogenous Markov chain. These repeated
games lead to gambling houses with transitions of the form: X is a simplex ∆(K), and
Γ(x) = {pM, p ∈ ∆(X) centered at x} with M a fixed stochastic matrix. Here again,
transitions are non-expansive, see [Gensbittel and Renault, 2015].
Let us mention immediately an important consequence of the non-expansive as-
sumption. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 2.5. Assume the gambling game is non-expansive. Then the family
{vλ}λ∈(0,1] is equicontinuous.
As a consequence, point-wise and uniform convergence of {vλ} are equivalent, and
since X × Y is compact, to prove convergence of {vλ} it is enough to prove uniqueness
of a limit point.6
Remark 2.6. It is not difficult to see that without non-expansivity, {vλ} may not be
equicontinuous and the convergence may not be uniform. For instance in red-and-black
casino with a single player, if the parameter w > 1
2
and u(x) = x, vλ is continuous for
every λ but v = lim
λ→0vλ is not : v(x) = 0 for x = 0 and v(x) = 1 for x > 0.
There may be cases where non-expansiveness does not hold but there is still equicon-
tinuity of vλ. In that case, Proposition 3.2 would still apply.
2.5 Excessive, depressive and balanced functions
Definition 2.7. Let v be in B(X × Y ).
1) v is balanced if ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y ,
v(x, y) = maxp∈Γ(x) minq∈Λ(y) v˜(p, q) = minq∈Λ(y) maxp∈Γ(x) v˜(p, q).
2) v is excessive (with respect to X) if: ∀(x, y) ∈ X×Y , v(x, y) = maxp∈Γ(x) v˜(p, y).
3) v is depressive (with respect to Y ) if: ∀(x, y) ∈ X×Y , v(x, y) = minq∈Λ(y) v˜(x, q).
Observe that any uniform limit v of (vλ)λ∈(0,1] is necessarily continuous and balanced
(by passing to the limit in definition 2.2).
In a splitting game, excessive means concave with respect to the first variable, and
depressive means convex with respect to the second variable.
Definition 2.8.
The gambling game is leavable if: ∀x ∈ X, δx ∈ Γ(x) and ∀y ∈ Y, δy ∈ Λ(y).
6By convergence or limit point of {vλ}, we always mean when λ approaches 0.
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The gambling game is leavable if each player can remain in any given state. This
is a standard assumption [Dubins and Savage, 1965]. This is the case in casinos and
splitting games. In the persuasion literature and in repeated games with incomplete
information, not moving means revealing no information.
Remark 2.9. If the game is leavable, any excessive and depressive function in B(X)
is balanced (the converse is not true as example 2.10 shows). Indeed, since the game
is leavable, δy ∈ Λ(y) and so
min
q∈Γ(y)
max
p∈Γ(x)
v˜(p, q) ≤ max
p∈Γ(x)
v˜(p, y) = v(x, y)
the equality being due to excessivity. By symmetry,
max
p∈Γ(x)
min
q∈Γ(y)
v˜(p, q) ≥ v(x, y)
since maxmin ≤ minmax, the value exists and (δx, δy) is a saddle point, implying in
particular that the game is balanced.
Example 2.10. Consider a gambling game where players 1 and 2 move on the same
finite grid of a circle containing 6 nodes in equidistant positions. Any player can move
one step to the left, one step to the right, or not move (and choose randomly between
these 3 options, so that transitions have convex values). This game is leavable. It is
here possible for a player to go from any state to any other state in at most 3 stages
(the game may be called cyclic), so any excessive and depressive function is necessarily
constant. Suppose that Player 1’s payoff is 1 if he is at most one step away from Player
2, and Player 1’s payoff is 0 otherwise. If the players start a distance at most 1, Player
1 can guarantee that this property will hold forever by not moving or moving one step
to the direction of Player 2 and so, in this case we have vλ = 1 for every λ. On the
other hand, if the players start at a distance at least 2, Player 2 can insure that this
property will hold forever, by not moving or moving one step in the opposite direction
of Player 1. For these initial states, vλ = 0 for every λ. Here, v = lim vλ is balanced,
but neither excessive nor depressive.
Definition 2.11. A gambling game is standard if both state spaces X and Y are com-
pact metric, the running payoff u is continuous, and the transitions Γ and Λ have non
empty convex compact values and are leavable and non-expansive.
Throughout the paper, we consider only standard gambling games.
2.6 Acyclicity
We now come to the main new conditions of the paper.
8
Definition 2.12.
The gambling house Γ of player 1 is weakly acyclic if there exists ϕ in B(X) lower
semi-continuous such that:
∀x ∈ X,Argmaxp∈Γ(x)ϕ˜(p) = {δx}.
Similarly, the gambling house Λ of player 2 is weakly acyclic if there exists ψ in B(Y )
upper semi-continuous such that:
∀y ∈ Y,Argminq∈Λ(y)ψ˜(q) = {δy}.
The gambling game is weakly acyclic if both gambling houses are weakly acyclic.
(Notice that both definitions are equivalent by considering ψ = −ϕ).
Observe that a weakly acyclic gambling game is necessarily leavable. Weak acyclic-
ity is, to our knowledge, a new condition in the gambling house literature. If the house
Γ is weakly acyclic, the “potential” ϕ decreases in expectation along non stationary
trajectories, hence the irreversibility of the process in the space of probabilities over
X.
Example 2.13. When w ≤ 1
2
, a red-and-black casino is weakly acyclic and similarly for
any casino which is not superfair (take ϕ to be strictly increasing and strictly concave).
A splitting game is weakly acyclic (take ϕ to be any strictly concave function).
We will now define strong acyclicity, our central condition. For this, we need to
consider transitions for several stages. We first extend linearly the transitions to ∆(X)
and ∆(Y ) by defining Γ˜ : ∆(X) ⇒ ∆(X) and Λ˜ : ∆(Y ) ⇒ ∆(Y ). More precisely,
the graph of Γ˜ is defined as the closure of the convex hull of the graph of Γ (viewed
as the subset {(δx, p), x ∈ X, p ∈ Γ(x)} of ∆(X) ×∆(X)), and similarly the graph of
Λ˜ is defined as the closed convex hull of the graph of Λ. Because Dirac measures are
extreme points of ∆(X) and ∆(Y ), we have Γ˜(δx) = Γ(x) and Λ˜(δy) = Λ(y) for each x
in X and y in Y . Be careful that in general, for p in ∆(X) and q in ∆(Y ):
v˜λ(p, q) =
∫
X
∫
Y
v(x′, y′)dp(x′)dq(y′) 6= max
p′∈Γ˜(p)
min
q′∈Λ˜(q)
(λu(p, q) + (1− λ)v˜λ(p′, q′)) .
We now define inductively a sequence of transitions (Γ˜n)n from ∆(X) to ∆(X), by
Γ˜0(p) = {p} for every state p in ∆(X), and7 for each n ≥ 0, Γ˜n+1 = Γ˜n ◦ Γ˜ . Γ˜n(δx)
represents the set of probabilities over states that Player 1 can reach in n stages from
the initial state x in X. Similarly we define Λ˜n for each n.
Definition 2.14.
1) The reachable set of Player 1 from state x in X is the closure of
⋃
n≥0 Γ˜
n(δx) in
∆(X), and is denoted Γ∞(x). Similarly, the reachable set of Player 2 from state y in
Y is the subset Λ∞(y) of ∆(Y ) defined as the closure of
⋃
n≥0 Λ˜
n(δy).
7The composition being defined by G ◦H(p) = {p” ∈ ∆(X),∃p′ ∈ H(p) s.t. p” ∈ G(p′)}.
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2) The gambling house Γ of player 1 is strongly acyclic (or simply, acyclic) if there
exists ϕ in B(X) lower semi-continuous such that:
∀x ∈ X,Argmaxp∈Γ∞(x)ϕ˜(p) = {δx}.
Similarly, the gambling house Λ of player 2 is strongly acyclic (or simply, acyclic) if
there exists ψ in B(Y ) upper semi-continuous such that:
∀y ∈ Y,Argminq∈Λ∞(y)ψ˜(q) = {δy}.
The gambling game is strongly acyclic (or simply, acyclic) if both gambling houses are
strongly acyclic.
Observe that the notion of acyclicity is payoff irrelevant (does not depend on the
utility function u). Also, notice that since Γ is standard, for every x ∈ X, (Γ˜n(δx))n
is increasing (for set inclusion), and Γ∞(x) = limnΓ˜n(δx). Since Γ∞(x) ⊃ Γ(x), strong
acyclicity of Γ implies weak acyclicity of Γ.
In splitting games, Γ˜n(δx) = Γ(x) for every n and x in X, so weak and strong
acyclicity coincide.8 We will give in section 4.2 a standard gambling house Γ on a finite
set X that is weakly but not strongly acyclic (i.e. Γ∞ is not weakly acyclic).
If Γ(x) is the set of splittings at x with support at most K, then Γ2(x) is the set of
splittings at x with support at most K2, ..., and Γ∞(x) is the set of all splittings at x.
One can show that Γ is weakly acyclic with respect to a continuous φ if and only
if Γ˜n(δx) is weakly acyclic with respect to φ for every n < +∞. This shows that the
weak acyclicity property may be lost at n = +∞ and that the difference between weak
and strong acyclicity is formally sharp.
3 Main Results
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a standard gambling game.
1. If at least one of the players has a strongly acyclic gambling house, (vλ) uniformly
converges to the unique function v in C(X × Y ) satisfying:
a) v is excessive (in X), i.e. ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y , v(x, y) = maxp∈Γ(x) v˜(p, y),
b) v is depressive (in Y ), i.e. ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y , v(x, y) = minq∈Γ(y) v˜(x, q),
c) v satisfies P1, i.e. ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, ∃p ∈ Γ∞(x), v(x, y) = v˜(p, y) ≤ u(p, y),
d) v satisfies P2, i.e. ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, ∃q ∈ Λ∞(y), v(x, y) = v˜(x, q) ≥ u(x, q).
Moreover v = limvλ is the largest excessive-depressive continuous function satisfying
P1, and is also the smallest excessive-depressive continuous function satisfying P2.
2. Even if both gambling houses are weakly acyclic, (vλ) may not converge.
The conditions of the positive result 1. may be interpreted as follows:
8For other examples of strongly acyclic houses, see appendix (section 8.5).
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• a) and b) : It is always safe not to move. For each player, not moving ensures
not to degrade the limit value.
• c) and d) : Each player can reach, if his opponent does not move, the zone when
the current payoff is at least as good than the limit value, without degrading the
limit value.
These interpretations will lead later to the construction of simple uniformly optimal
strategies under some additional assumptions, see section 8. The convergence and
characterization result 1. of theorem 3.1 relies on the following three propositions
(proved in the appendix). Recall that, thanks to proposition 2.5, to get convergence of
the values it is enough to show uniqueness of a limit point of (vλ)λ.
Proposition 3.2. Assume that one of the players has a weakly acyclic gambling house.
If v in C(X × Y ) is balanced, then v is excessive and depressive.
Without weak acyclicity on one side, a balanced function may not be excessive and
depressive as example 2.10 shows.
Proposition 3.3. Let v be a limit point of (vλ) for the uniform convergence. Then v
is balanced, and satisfies P1 and P2.
This proposition provides some properties that all limit points of (vλ) should satisfy.
The next proposition shows that strong acyclicity on one side implies that at most one
function will satisfy those properties.
Proposition 3.4. Assume that one of the players has a strongly acyclic gambling
house. Then, any balanced continuous function satisfying P1 is smaller than any bal-
anced continuous function satisfying P2. Consequently, there is at most one balanced
continuous function satisfying P1 and P2.
On the other hand, if none of the players has a strongly acyclic gambling house, one
can prove that there may be infinitely many balanced continuous functions satisfying
P1 and P2. This will be the case in our counterexamples of section 4.4, where both
gambling houses are weakly acyclic. Moreover, one of the counterexamples show that
the family of discounted values may not converge as λ goes to zero. This shows that
our results are tight and that strong acyclicity condition on one side has very strong
consequences both on the convergence of (vλ) and on the characterization of the limit.
4 Examples
4.1 A strongly acyclic gambling house
Let us first illustrate our characterization on a simple example. Consider the following
Markov decision process with 3 states: X = {a, b, c} from [Sorin, 2002]. States b and c
11
are absorbing with respective payoffs 1 and 0. Start at a, choose α ∈ I = [0, 1/2], and
move to b with proba α and to c with proba α2.
"!
# 
a
0
"!
# 
b
1* "!
# 
c
0*
	
6
α
1− α− α2
α2
R
Here formally Y is a singleton (there is only one player, so we can omit the variable
y), Γ(b) = {δb}, Γ(c) = {δc}, and Γ(a) = conv{(1−α−α2)δa +αδb +α2δc, α ∈ I}. The
payoffs are u(a) = u(c) = 0, u(b) = 1.
Γ has compact convex values, the transitions are 1-Lipschitz, and the game is
leavable. The gambling game is strongly acyclic: just consider ϕ such that ϕ(a) = 1,
and ϕ(b) = ϕ(c) = 0.
Player 1 can go from state a to state b in infinitely many stages with arbitrarily
high probability, by repeating a choice of α > 0 small (so that α2 is much smaller than
α), and the limit value v clearly satisfies:
v(a) = v(b) = 1, v(c) = 0.
This is the unique function w : X → IR satisfying the conditions a), b), c), d) of
Theorem 3.1: P1 and P2 implies u ≤ w ≤ 1, and because b and c are absorbing states,
w(b) = 1 and w(c) = 0. Finally, w excessive gives w(a) = 1. Notice that δb ∈ Γ∞(a)
but for each n, δb /∈ Γ˜n(a).
4.2 A weakly acyclic gambling house
Let us modify the gambling house of the previous section 4.1. We still have a unique
player and a state space X = {a, b, c}. The only difference is that state b is no longer
absorbing : in state b the player also has to choose some α ∈ I = [0, 1/2], and then
moves to a with probability α, to c with probability α2 and remains in b with probability
1− α− α2.
"!
# 
a
"!
# 
b
"!
# 
c
	
6
α
1− α− α2
α2
R

α

1− α− α2
-
α2
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States a and b are now symmetric. This gambling house is weakly acyclic, with
ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) = 1, ϕ(c) = 0, but it is not strongly acyclic since a ∈ Γ∞(b) and b ∈ Γ∞(a).
We will later use this gambling house to construct our counterexample of theorem 3.1,
2).
4.3 An example with countable state spaces
We present here a (strongly) acyclic gambling game with countable state spaces, and
illustrate the proof of proposition 3.2, that under weak acyclicity any continuous bal-
anced function is also excessive and depressive. Consider the state space:
X = {1− 1
n
, n ∈ IN∗} ∪ {1} = {x1, ..., xn, ...., x∞},
where xn = 1 − 1n if n is finite, and x∞ = 1. We use d(x, x′) = |x − x′|, so that X is
countable and compact. The transition is given by:
Γ(xn) = {αδxn + (1− α)δxn+1 , α ∈ [0, 1]}, and Γ(x∞) = {δx∞}.
The intuition is clear: Player 1 can stay at his location, or move 1 to the right. The
gambling house (Y,Λ) of Player 2 is a copy of the gambling house of Player 1. Transi-
tions are non-expansive (since | 1
n+1
− 1
n′+1 | ≤ | 1n− 1n′ |), and the game is strongly acyclic.
The payoff u is any continuous function X × Y −→ IR, so that theorem 3.1 applies.
Consider v : X × Y −→ IR, and for simplicity we use w(n,m) = v(xn, xm). Here v
excessive means that w(n,m) is weakly decreasing in n, and v depressive means that
w(n,m) is weakly increasing in m. The meaning of v balanced is the following: for
each n and m, w(n,m) is the value of the matrix game (“local game” at (n,m)):(
w(n+ 1,m) w(n+ 1,m+ 1)
w(n,m) w(n,m+ 1)
)
.
Clearly, if v is excessive and depressive it is balanced, but proposition 3.2 tells that
if v is continuous, then the converse also holds: balancedness implies excessiveness and
depressiveness. The idea of the proof of proposition 3.2 can be seen here as follows.
Suppose v is balanced, but not excessive. Then one can find n and m such that
w(n+ 1,m) > w(n,m). Because w(n,m) is the value of the local game at (n,m),
we necessarily have w(n + 1,m + 1) ≤ w(n,m), and w(n + 1,m) > w(n + 1,m + 1).
Consider now the “local game” at (n+ 1,m). w(n+ 1,m) is the value of the matrix:(
w(n+ 2,m) w(n+ 2,m+ 1)
w(n+ 1,m) w(n+ 1,m+ 1)
)
.
Since w(n + 1,m) > w(n + 1,m + 1), we obtain w(n + 2,m + 1) ≥ w(n + 1,m). We
have obtained: w(n+ 2,m+ 1) ≥ w(n+ 1,m) > w(n,m) ≥ w(n+ 1,m+ 1), so
w(n+ 2,m+ 1)− w(n+ 1,m+ 1) > w(n+ 1,m)− w(n,m).
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Iterating the argument, we obtain that for each p,
w(n+ p+ 1,m+ p)− w(n+ p,m+ p) ≥ w(n+ 1,m)− w(n,m) > 0.
And this is a contradiction with w being continuous at infinity.
To conclude with this example, consider the simple case where the running payoff
is given by u(x, y) = |x−y|. Player 1 wants to be far from Player 2, and Player 2 wants
to be close to Player 1. If initially n < m, it is optimal for each player not to move, so
w(n,m) = |xn − xm|. Suppose on the contrary that initially n ≥ m, so that Player 1
is more to the right than Player 2. Then Player 2 has a simple optimal strategy which
is to move to the right if the current positions satisfy x > y, and to stay at y if x = y.
No matter how large is the initial difference n−m, Player 2 will succeed in being close
to player, so that w(n,m) = 0 if n ≥ m.
4.4 A weakly acyclic game without limit value
Here we prove the second part of theorem 3.1 by providing a counterexample to the
convergence of (vλ) in a weakly acyclic non-expansive gambling house.
The states and transitions for Player 1 are as in example 4.2:
"!
# 
a
"!
# 
b
"!
# 
c
	
6
αa
1− αa − α2a
α2a
R

αb

1− αb − α2b
-
α2b
The set of states of Player 1 is X = {a, b, c}. The difference with example 4.2 is that
the set of possible choices for αa and αb may be smaller than [0, 1/2]. Here αa and
αb now belong to some fixed compact set I ⊂ [0, 1/2] such9 that 0 is in the closure of
I\{0}. Then 0 ∈ I, the transitions are leavable and non-expansive. States a and b are
symmetric, this gambling house is weakly acyclic, with ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) = 1, ϕ(c) = 0, but
not strongly acyclic since a ∈ Γ∞(b) and b ∈ Γ∞(a).
The gambling house of Player 2 is a copy of the gambling house of Player 1, with
state space Y = {a′, b′, c′} and a compact set of choices J ⊂ [0, 1/2] such that 0 is in
the closure of J\{0}. The unique difference between the gambling houses of the players
is that I and J may be different. Payoffs are simple:
u(x, y) = 0 if x = y, u(x, y) = 1 if x 6= y.
9Except in part 2 of theorem 4.2 where we will consider the case I = {0, 1/4}.
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The u function can be written as follows
a′ b′ c′
a 0 1 1
b 1 0 1
c 1 1 0
, with a clear interpreta-
tion : Player 1 and Player 2 both move on a space with 3 points, Player 2 wants to be
at the same location as Player 1, and Player 1 wants the opposite.
Here the gambling game is weakly acyclic but not strongly acyclic, and the following
lemma shows that the uniqueness property of proposition 3.4 fails.
Lemma 4.1. Let v : X × Y −→ IR. Then A) and B) are equivalent:
A) v is excessive, depressive, and satisfies P1 and P2,
B) There exists x ∈ [0, 1] such that v can be written:
a′ b′ c′
a x x 1
b x x 1
c 0 0 0
Proof: Assume v satisfies A). Since u takes values in [0, 1], so does v. Because c and
c′ are absorbing, we have v(c, c′) = u(c, c′) = 0.
Consider now v(c, a′). v being depressive, for any fixed β∗ > 0 in J we have:
v(c, a′) ≤ β∗v(c, b′) + β∗2v(c, c′) + (1− β∗ − β∗2)v(c, a′).
and we obtain v(c, a′) ≤ 1
1+β∗v(c, b
′). But symmetrically we also have v(c, b′) ≤
1
1+β∗v(c, a
′), and we get v(c, a′) = v(c, b′) = 0.
Consider now v(a, c′). By P2, we obtain that v(a, c′) ≥ u(a, c′) = 1, and v(a, c′) = 1.
Similarly, v(b, c′) = 1.
Consider now v(a, a′). v being excessive, for any α > 0 in I we have:
v(a, a′) ≥ αv(b, a′) + α2v(c, a′) + (1− α− α2)v(a, a′).
Hence v(a, a′) ≥ 1
1+α
v(b, a′), and by assumption on I we obtain v(a, a′) ≥ v(b, a′). By
symmetry of the transitions between a and b, v(a, a′) = v(b, a′). Similarly, v(a, b′) =
v(b, b′).
It only remains to prove that v(a, a′) = v(a, b′). v being depressive, for any β > 0
in J , v(a, a′) ≤ βv(a, b′) + β2v(a, c′) + (1− β− β2)v(a, a′). By assumption on J , we get
v(a, a′) ≤ v(a, b′). By symmetry of the transitions between b and b′, v(a, b′) = v(a, a′),
and v satisfies B).
One can easily check that B) implies A), and the proof of lemma 4.1 is complete.
The second part of theorem 3.1 is a direct consequence of point 3 of the following
theorem.
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Theorem 4.2.
1) If I = J = [0, 1/4], the limit value exists and is:
a′ b′ c′
a 1/2 1/2 1
b 1/2 1/2 1
c 0 0 0
2) If J = [0, 1/4] and I = {0, 1/4}, the limit value exists and is:
a′ b′ c′
a 0 0 1
b 0 0 1
c 0 0 0
3) If J = [0, 1/4] and I = { 1
4n
, n ∈ IN∗} ∪ {0}, then vλ diverges.
For the proof see appendix (section 7.3).
5 Extensions
5.1 Gambling houses (or Markov Decision Processes)
We assume here that there is a unique player, i.e. that Y is a singleton. Then
non-expansiveness is enough to guarantee the uniform convergence of (vλ)λ (as well as
the uniform value, see [Renault, 2011]) and the limit v can be characterized as follows
[Renault and Venel, 2016]: for all x in X,
v(x) = inf{w(x), w : ∆(X)→ IR affine C0 s.t.
(1) ∀x′ ∈ X,w(x′) ≥ sup
p∈Γ(x′)
w(p), and (2) ∀r ∈ R,w(r) ≥ u(r)},
where R = {p ∈ ∆(X), (p, p) ∈ Graph Γ˜} is interpreted as the set of invariant measures
for the gambling house (which is not necessarily leavable here). If we moreover assume
that the gambling house is leavable, then R = ∆(X) and we recover the fundamental
theorem of gambling ([Dubins and Savage, 1965], [Maitra and Sudderth, 1996]), namely,
(vλ) uniformly converges to:
v = min{w ∈ C(X), w excessive , w ≥ u} = min{w ∈ B(X), w excessive , w ≥ u}.
It is also easy to see that v(x) = supp∈Γ∞(x) u(p) for each x.
Our approach will lead to other characterizations. We don’t assume any acyclicity
condition in the following theorem.
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Theorem 5.1. Consider a one player (leavable and non-expansive) gambling house.
Then (vλ) uniformly converges to the unique function v in C(X) satisfying: v is excessive,
P1 : ∀x ∈ X, ∃p ∈ Γ∞(x), v(x) = v˜(p) ≤ u˜(p), and P2 : v ≥ u.
Proof: From proposition 3.3 any accumulation point of (vλ) is excessive and satisfies
P1 and P2. Thus, we just need to show uniqueness, which is a direct consequence of
the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. If v1 ∈ B(X) satisfies P1 and v2 ∈ C(X) is excessive and satisfies P2,
then v1 ≤ v2.
Proof: Take any x ∈ X. Then there is p ∈ Γ∞(x) such that v1(x) = v1(p) ≤ u(p).
Because v2 is excessive and continuous, by lemma 7.3 v2(x) ≥ v2(p). Since v2 ≥ u, we
have v2(p) ≥ u(p). Consequently, one has v2(x) ≥ u(p). Thus, v1(x) − v2(x) ≤ 0, as
desired.
Using the gambling fundamental theorem, we obtain new viewpoints on the char-
acterization of the limit value in leavable gambling houses.
Corollary 5.3. Consider a one player standard gambling house. Then the asymptotic
value exists and is:
(1) the smallest excessive function v in B(X) satisfying P2;
(2) the largest excessive function v in B(X) satisfying P1;
(3) the unique excessive function v in B(X) satisfying P1 and P2.
Moreover, v is continuous.
5.2 Other characterizations and link with the Mertens Zamir
system
Recall that we consider standard gambling games.
Definition 5.4. Consider g in C(X×Y ). The excessive envelope of g, ExcΓ(g), is the
smallest excessive (w.r.t. X) function greater or equal to g and the depressive envelope
of g, DepΛ(g) is the largest depressive (w.r.t. Y ) function smaller or equal to g.
The existence of ExcΓ(g) (and similarly DepΛ(g)) is standard: for every (x, y), we
have ExcΓ(g)(x, y) = inf{f(x, y) s.t. f(x′, y) ≥ g(x′, y) for all x′, and f is bounded
measurable and Γ-excessive}. Clearly, ExcΓ(g) ≥ g. Moreover, for every f ∈ B(X, Y )
which is Γ-excessive and satisfies f(x′, y) ≥ g(x′, y) for all x′, every (x, y) ∈ X, and
every σ ∈ Γ(x), we have ∫ ExcΓ(g)(x′, y)dσ(x′) ≤ ∫ f(x′, y)dσ(x′) ≤ f(x, y). Taking
the infimum w.r.t. f , one obtains that ExcΓ(g) is Γ-excessive and so, the smallest
excessive (w.r.t. X) function greater or equal to g.
ExcΓ is usually called the re´duite operator and DepΛ(g) = −ExcΓ(−g). In splitting
games, ExcΓ = CavX is the concavification operator on X and DepΛ(g) = V exY is the
convexification operator on Y . We introduce the following definition by analogy with
the Mertens-Zamir characterization.
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Definition 5.5. A function v in C(X × Y ) satisfies the MZ-characterization if:
MZ1 : ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, v(x, y) = ExcΓ min(u, v)(x, y),
and MZ2 : ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, v(x, y) = DepΛ max(u, v)(x, y).
We now introduce other properties, by analogy with the one established for splitting
games and repeated games with incomplete information, see for instance [Laraki, 2001b],
[Laraki, 2001a], and [Rosenberg and Sorin, 2001].
Definition 5.6. Let v be in C(X × Y ).
1) For each (x, y) in X × Y ,
x is extreme for v(·, y) if arg maxp∈Γ∞(x) v˜(p, y) = {δx}.
y is extreme for v(x, ·) if arg minq∈Λ∞(y) v˜(x, q) = {δy}.
2) v satisfies the E-characterization if:
E1 : for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y, if x is extreme for v(·, y) then v(x, y) ≤ u(x, y),
and E2 : for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y, if y is extreme for v(x , ·) then v(x, y) ≥ u(x, y).
Proposition 5.7. Consider a standard gambling game and let v in C(X × Y ) be ex-
cessive and depressive. Then:
v satisfies MZ1 =⇒ v satisfies P1 =⇒ v satisfies E1,
and v satisfies MZ2 =⇒ v satisfies P2 =⇒ v satisfies E2.
Proof. Let v be a continuous excessive function that satisfies MZ1. Fix y and define
for each x, f(x) = min(v(x, y), u(x, y)). Then, for every x, v(x, y) = ExcΓ(f)(x).
We consider the gambling house for Player 1 where the state of Player 2 is fixed to
y and the payoff is given by f . From corollary 5.3, there is p ∈ Γ∞(x) such that
v(x, y) = v(p, y) ≤ f(p). Since f(p) ≤ u(p, y), v satisfies P1.
Now, let v be an excessive continuous function that satisfies P1. Take any x and
y and suppose that x is extreme for v(·, y). By P1, there is p∗ ∈ Γ∞(x) such that
v(x, y) = v(p∗, y) ≤ u(p∗, y). Because v is excessive and continuous, by lemma 7.3
we have p∗ ∈ arg maxp∈Γ∞ v˜(p, y). Because x is extreme for v(·, y), p∗ = δx and so,
v(x, y) ≤ u(x, y). Consequently, E1 is satisfied.
By symmetry, MZ2 =⇒ P2 =⇒ E2.
Remark 5.8. It is easy to find examples where E1 is satisfied but MZ1 is not. For
instance, assume that Y is a singleton, and that Γ(x) = ∆(X) for each x in X. Consider
the constant, hence excessive, functions u = 0 and v = 1. v has no extreme points
hence trivially satisfies E1, but ExcΓ min(u, v) = u and so, v does not satisfy MZ1.
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Proposition 5.9. Consider a standard gambling game and let v be an excessive-
depressive function in C(X × Y ). Then:
(Γ strongly acyclic) and (v satisfies E1) =⇒ (v satisfies MZ1),
and;
(Λ strongly acyclic) and (v satisfies E2) =⇒ (v satisfies MZ2).
Consequently, if the gambling game is strongly acyclic, characterizations MZ, P
and E are equivalents.
Proof. Let v be excessive-depressive that satisfies E1. Fix y ∈ Y . We want
to show that v(x, y) = g(x, y) where g = ExcΓ(f) and f = min(u, v). g is con-
tinuous by corollary 5.3. Since v is excessive and v ≥ f , we have v ≥ g. Let
Z = arg maxx∈X v(x, y) − g(x, y) and let x0 = arg minx∈Z ϕ(x), where ϕ comes form
the definition of acyclicity. It is enough to prove that v(x0, y) ≤ g(x0, y).
Suppose not. We have g(x0, y) ≥ f(x0, y), so (1) g(x0, y) ≥ u(x0, y). Now, let
p0 ∈ Γ∞(x0) such that v(x0, y) = v(p0, y). Because g is excessive and continuous,
g(p0, y) ≤ g(x0, y) (lemma 7.3). Consequently, v(p0, y)− g(p0, y) ≥ v(x0, y)− g(x0, y).
Consequently, p0 is supported on Z. Thus, ϕ(x0, y) ≤ ϕ(p0, y), and by strong acyclicity
p0 = δx0 . Thus x0 is an extreme point of v(·, y). By E1, we have (2) v(x0, y) ≤ u(x0, y).
By (1) and (2), v(x0, y)− g(x0, y) ≤ 0. A contradiction.
6 Conclusion, open problems and future directions
We introduce the class of gambling games. It is a sub-class of stochastic games which
includes MDP problems, splitting games and product stochastic games. We define a
strong notion of acyclicity under which we prove existence of the asymptotic value
v and we establish several characterizations of v which are linked to the Mertens-
Zamir system of functional equations (re-formulated in our more general set-up). We
also prove that our condition is tight: a slight weakening of acyclicity implies non-
existence of the asymptotic value. Our example is the first in the class of product
stochastic games and is probably the simplest known counterexample of convergence
for finite state spaces and compact action set (the first counterexample in this class
was established in [Vigeral, 2013]). Many questions merit to be investigated in a future
research:
• In standard gambling games, is it possible to characterize the asymptotic value in
models where we know it exists (for example when X and Y are finite, transition
function is polynomial and Γ and Λ are definable [Bolte et al., 2015] in an o-
minimal structure)? We know that the asymptotic value is balanced and satisfy
P1 and P2, but we may have infinitely many functions satisfying those properties.
• Is there an asymptotic value if one house is strongly acyclic and the other not
necessarily leavable? As seen, even when both houses are weakly acyclic, we may
have divergence: strong acyclicity of one of the two houses is necessary.
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• Recently splitting games have been extended to continuous time and linked to dif-
ferential games with incomplete information [Gensbittel and Rainer, 2017]. How
our model and results extend to continuous time? The one player game has been
investigated in [Buckdahn et al., 2015] and [Li et al., 2016].
• It would be interesting to study the non-zero sum analogue of this model. Actu-
ally, a static version of non-zero-sum splitting games, with a discontinuous payoff
function, has been recently explored by [Koessler et al., 2018] and one natural
extension is the dynamic model. Observe that for each discount factor λ, under
some regularity assumptions, one can prove existence of subgame perfect equi-
librium payoffs Eλ, and establish a standard recursive structure. An interesting
question is : does Eλ converges as λ goes to zero -if all players have a strongly
acyclic gambling house- and if so, how to characterize this limit.
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7 Appendix A: missing proofs
7.1 Proof of proposition 2.5
u being uniformly continuous over the compact set X × Y , we consider a concave
modulus of continuity ω : IR+ −→ IR+:
|u(x, y)− u(x′, y′)| ≤ ω(d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)), ∀x, x′ ∈ X, ∀y, y′ ∈ Y.
ω is non decreasing, concave and lim0 ω = 0. Denote by C the set of functions v in
C(X × Y ) satisfying: |v(x, y)− v(x′, y′)| ≤ ω(d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)), ∀x, x′ ∈ X, ∀y, y′ ∈ Y.
We start with a lemma.
Lemma 7.1. For v in C, p, p′ in ∆(X), q, q′ in ∆(Y ),
|v˜(p, q)− v˜(p′, q′)| ≤ ω(dKR(p, p′) + dKR(q, q′)).
Proof of lemma 7.1: By the Kantorovich duality theorem, there exists µ in ∆(X ×X)
with first marginal p and second marginal p′ satisfying: dKR(p, p′) =
∫
X×X d(x, x
′)dµ(x, x′).
Similarly there exists ν in ∆(Y × Y ) with first marginal q and second marginal q′ sat-
isfying: dKR(q, q
′) =
∫
Y×Y d(y, y
′)dν(y, y′). We have for all x, x′, y, y′:
v(x, y) ≥ v(x′, y′)− ω(d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)).
We integrate the above inequality with respect to the probability µ ⊗ ν, and obtain
using the concavity of ω:
v˜(p, q) ≥ v˜(p′, q′)−
∫
X2×Y 2
ω(d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)) dµ(x, x′)dν(y, y′),
≥ v˜(p′, q′)− ω
(∫
X2×Y 2
d(x, x′) + d(y, y′) dµ(x, x′)dν(y, y′)
)
= v˜(p′, q′)− ω (dKR(p, p′) + dKR(q, q′)) .
We now return to the proof of proposition 2.5. Fix λ in (0, 1]. Given v in C, define
Φ(v) : X × Y −→ IR by: Φ(v)(x, y) = supp∈Γ(x) infq∈Λ(y) λ u(x, y) + (1− λ) v˜(p, q).
Consider the zero-sum game with strategy spaces Γ(x) and Λ(y) and payoff function
(p, q) 7→ λ u(x, y) + (1 − λ) v˜(p, q). The strategy spaces are convex compact and the
payoff function is continuous and affine in each variable, hence by Sion’s theorem we
have:
Φ(v)(x, y) = max
p∈Γ(x)
min
q∈Λ(y)
λ u(x, y)+(1−λ) v˜(p, q) = min
q∈Λ(y)
max
p∈Γ(x)
λ u(x, y)+(1−λ) v˜(p, q).
Consider (x, y) and (x′, y′) in X × Y , and let p in Γ(x) be an optimal strategy
of Player 1 in the zero-sum game corresponding to (x, y). The gambling game has
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non-expansive transitions, so there exists p′ ∈ Γ(x′) such that dKR(p, p′) ≤ d(x, x′).
Consider any q′ in Λ(y′), there exists q in Γ(y) with dKR(q, q′) ≤ d(y, y′). Now, using
lemma 7.1 we write:
λu(x′, y′) + (1− λ)v˜(p′, q′)
≥ λ(u(x, y)− ω(d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)) + (1− λ)(v˜(p, q)− ω(dKR(p, p′) + dKR(q, q′))),
≥ Φ(v)(x, y)− ω(d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)).
We obtain Φ(v)(x′, y′) ≥ Φ(v)(x, y)− ω(d(x, x′) + d(y, y′)), and Φ(v) belongs to C.
The rest of the proof is very standard. C is a complete metric space for ‖v − w‖ =
sup(x,y)∈X×Y |v(x, y)−w(x, y)|, and we have ‖Φ(v)−Φ(w)‖ ≤ (1− λ)‖v −w‖, so Φ is
(1−λ)-contracting. Hence Φ has a unique fixed point which is vλ. Each vλ is in C, and
we obtain that the family (vλ)λ∈(0,1] is equicontinuous, ending the proof of proposition
2.5.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1, part 1.
We prove here propositions 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
7.2.1 Proof of proposition 3.2
By symmetry, suppose that Γ is weakly acyclic and Λ Leavable. Let us prove that
any balanced continuous function v is excessive-depressive. Let us first prove that v is
excessive.
Fix any (x0, y0) in X × Y , and p1 ∈ Γ(x0). A direct consequence of balancedness
is the existence of q1 in Λ(y0) such that v(p1, q1) ≤ v(x0, y0). Now, p1 is in ∆(X) and
q1 is in ∆(Y ). One has to be careful that there may not exist p2 ∈ Γ˜(p1) such that
for all q2 ∈ Λ˜(q1), v(p2, q2) ≥ v(p1, q1). This is because, v˜ being affine in each variable,
v(p1, q1) can be interpreted as the value of the auxiliary game where first x and y
are chosen according to p1 ⊗ q1 and observed by the players, then players respectively
choose p ∈ Γ(x) and q ∈ Λ(y) and finally Player 1’s payoff is v(p, q). And to play well
in this game Player 1 has to know the realization of q1 before choosing p. However
since y0 is a Dirac measure, balancedness implies that there exists p2 ∈ Γ˜(p1) such that
v(p2, q1) ≥ v(p1, y0). We have obtained the following lemma.
Lemma 7.2. Given (x0, y0) in X × Y , and p1 ∈ Γ(x0), there exists q1 in Λ(y0) and
p2 ∈ Γ˜(p1) such that: v(p1, q1) ≤ v(x0, y0) and v(p2, q1) ≥ v(p1, y0).
We now prove the proposition. Define, for x in X,
h(x) = Max{v(p, y)− v(x, y), y ∈ Y, p ∈ Γ(x)}.
h is continuous. We put Z = Argmaxx∈Xh(x), and consider x0 ∈ Argminx∈Zϕ(x),
where ϕ comes from the definition of Γ weakly acyclic.
24
x0 ∈ Z, so v is excessive if and only if h0 =def h(x0) ≤ 0. By definition of h(x0),
there exists p1 ∈ Γ(x0) and y0 in Y such that v(p1, y0)− v(x0, y0) = h0.
By lemma 7.2, there exists q1 in Λ(y0) and p2 ∈ Γ˜(p1) such that v(p1, q1) ≤ v(x0, y0)
and v(p2, q1) ≥ v(p1, y0). Consequently,
v(p2, q1)− v(p1, q1) ≥ v(p1, y0)− v(x0, y0) = h0.
One can now find y1 in Y such that v(p2, y1) − v(p1, y1) ≥ h0, and since p2 ∈ Γ˜(p1) it
implies that Supp(p1) ⊂ Z. But p1 ∈ Γ(x0), so by definition of x0 and weak acyclicity,
we obtain that p1 = δx0 . So h0 = 0, and v is excessive.
Let us now prove that when v is balanced and excessive then it is depressive. For
every (x, y), and every p ∈ Γ(x), we have v(x, y) ≥ v(p, y). Thus, for every (x, y),
p ∈ Γ(x) and every q ∈ Λ(y), v(x, q) ≥ v(p, q) and consequently, minq∈Λ(y) v(x, q) ≥
minq∈Λ(y) v(p, q). Taking the maximum in p ∈ Γ(x) and using that v is balanced
implies that minq∈Λ(y) v(x, q) ≥ v(x, y). Since Λ is leavable, we have equality and so v
is depressive with respect to Y .
7.2.2 Proof of proposition 3.3
Let (λn)n be a vanishing sequence of discount factors such that ‖vλn − v‖ →n→∞ 0.
We show first that v is balanced. From the Shapley equation, for every (x, y) in X×Y
one has:
vλn(x, y) = max
p∈Γ(x)
min
q∈Λ(y)
(λnu(x, y) + (1− λn)v˜λn(p, q)) ,
= λnu(x, y) + (1− λn) max
p∈Γ(x)
min
q∈Λ(y)
(v˜λn(p, q)) .
where max and min above commute (the value exists). Going to the limit and using the
fact that the operator (f 7→ maxp∈Γ(x) minq∈Λ(y)
(
f˜(p, q)
)
) on C(X, Y ) is non-expansive
and so continuous for the uniform topology, imply that v is balanced.
Fix (x, y) in X × Y , by symmetry it is enough to show that there exists p ∈ Γ∞(x)
such that v(x, y) ≤ v(p, y) ≤ u(p, y). If v(x, y) ≤ u(x, y), it is enough to consider
p = δx, so we assume v(x, y) > u(x, y). For n large enough, vλn(x, y) > u(x, y) + λn.
Fix n. We define inductively a sequence (pnt )t=0,...,Tn in ∆(X), with Tn ≥ 1, by:
1) pn0 = δx,
2) for each t ≥ 0 such that vλn(pnt , y) > u(pnt , y) + λn, we define pnt+1 in Γ˜(pnt ) by:
pnt+1 ∈ Argmaxp∈Γ˜(pnt ) (λnu(p
n
t , y) + (1− λn)vλn(p, y)) .
We have maxp∈Γ˜(pnt ) (λnu(p
n
t , y) + (1− λn)vλn(p, y)) ≥ vλn(pnt , y), so:
λnu(p
n
t , y) + (1− λn)vλn(pnt+1, y) ≥ vλn(pnt , y). (1)
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Since u(pnt , y) < vλn(p
n
t , y)− λn, we obtain:
vλn(p
n
t+1, y) ≥ vλn(pnt , y) +
λ2n
1− λn > vλn(p
n
t , y). (2)
Since λ
2
n
1−λn > 0 and vλn is bounded, there exists a first integer t = Tn where vλn(p
n
Tn
, y) ≤
u(pnTn , y) +λn, and we stop here the definition of the sequence (p
n
t )t=0,...,Tn . Inequalities
(1) and (2) above give:
vλn(x, y) ≤ vλn(pnTn−1, y) ≤ λnu(pnTn−1, y) + (1− λn)vλn(pnTn , y). (3)
Define now pn = pnTn for each n. p
n ∈ Γ˜Tn(x) ⊂ Γ∞(x) for each n, and we consider a
limit point p∗ ∈ Γ∞(x) of (pn)n. Because vλn is an equicontinuous family converging to
v, we obtain the convergence (along a subsequence) of vλn(p
n
Tn
, y) to v(p∗, y). Passing
to the limit in the inequality defining Tn then gives:
v(p∗, y) ≤ u(p∗, y).
Finally, passing to the limit in (3) shows: v(x, y) ≤ v(p∗, y).
7.2.3 Proof of proposition 3.4
We start with a lemma.
Lemma 7.3. Assume v in C(X × Y ) is excessive. Then for all (x0, y0) in X × Y and
all p ∈ Γ∞(x0), we have: v(p, y0) ≤ v(x0, y0).
Proof: p = limnpn, with pn ∈ Γ˜n(x0) for each n. It is enough to prove that v(pn, y0) ≤
v(x0, y0) for each n, and we do the proof by induction on n. The case n = 1 is clear
by definition of v excessive. Since pn+1 ∈ Γ˜(pn), it is enough to prove that for p′ in
∆(X) and p′′ ∈ Γ˜(p′), we have v(p′′, y0) ≤ v(p′, y0). By definition of Γ˜, (p′, p′′) is in the
closure of conv(GraphΓ).
y0 is fixed, and the function h : p −→ v(p, y0) is affine continous on ∆(X). The set
D =def {(p′, p′′) ∈ ∆(X)×∆(X), h(p′′) ≤ h(p′)}.
is convex and compact, and we want to show that Graph(Γ˜) = conv(GraphΓ) ⊂ D.
It it enough to prove that Graph(Γ) ⊂ D, and this is implied by the fact that v is
excessive. This concludes the proof of lemma 7.3.
We now prove the proposition. Assume one of the gambling houses is strongly
acyclic, and let v1 and v2 satisfying the conditions of proposition 3.4 (are continuous,
balanced, v1 satisfies P1 and v2 satisfies P2). We will show that v1 ≤ v2.
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By symmetry, suppose that Γ is strongly acyclic. From Proposition 3.2, v1 and v2
are excessive (in X) and depressive (in Y ). v1 − v2 being continuous on X × Y , define
the compact set:
Z = Argmax(x,y)∈X×Y v1(x, y)− v2(x, y).
Consider now ϕ u.s.c. given by the strong acyclicity condition of Γ. The set Z
being compact, there exists (x0, y0) minimizing ϕ(x) for (x, y) in Z.
By v2 satisfying P2, there exists q in Λ
∞(y0) such that v2(x0, y0) = v2(x0, q) ≥
u(x0, q). Thus, there is y
′
0 ∈ Supp(q) such that v2(x0, y′0) ≥ u(x0, y′0).
Because v1 is depressive, by lemma 7.3 we have v1(x0, q) ≥ v1(x0, y0) and we obtain
v1(x0, q)−v2(x0, q) ≥ v1(x0, y0)−v2(x0, y0). Since (x0, y0) is in Z, {x0}×Supp(q) ⊂ Z.
Thus, (x0, y
′
0) ∈ Z. Obviously, (x0, y′0) also minimizes ϕ(x) for (x, y) in Z (the minimum
value remains unchanged: ϕ(x0)).
By v1 satisfying P1, there exists p in Γ
∞(x0) such that: v1(x0, y′0) = v1(p, y
′
0) ≤
u(p, y′0). Because v2 is excessive, by lemma 7.3 we have v2(p, y
′
0) ≤ v2(x0, y′0) and we ob-
tain v1(p, y
′
0)−v2(p, y′0) ≥ v1(x0, y′0)−v2(x0, y′0). Since (x0, y′0) is in Z, Supp(p)×{y′0} ⊂
Z. By definition of (x0, y
′
0), this implies: ϕ(p) ≥ ϕ(x0). The definition of ϕ now gives
that p is the Dirac measure on x0. We obtain that v1(x0, y
′
0) = v1(p, y
′
0) ≤ u(x0, y′0).
So Max(x,y)∈X×Y v1(x, y)− v2(x, y) = v1(x0, y′0)− v2(x0, y′0) ≤ u(x0, y′0)− u(x0, y′0) = 0,
and thus v1 ≤ v2.
7.3 Proof of theorem 4.2
We start with considerations valid for the 3 cases of the theorem. We fix J = [0, 1/4]
in all the proof, and only assume for the moment that I is a compact subset of [0, 1/4]
containing 0 and 1/4.
Consider λ ∈ (0, 1). It is clear that vλ(c, c′) = 0, and vλ(a, c′) = vλ(b, c′) = 1.
By symmetry of the payoffs and transitions, we have vλ(a, a
′) = vλ(b, b′), vλ(b, a′) =
vλ(a, b
′) and vλ(c, c′) = vλ(c, b′), so we can write vλ as:
a′ b′ c′
a xλ yλ 1
b yλ xλ 1
c zλ zλ 0
with xλ, yλ and zλ in (0, 1).
zλ is indeed easy to compute. If the game is at (c, a
′), Player 1 can not move, and
Player 2 wants to reach c′ as fast as possible, so he will choose β = 1/4 and we have
(see definition 2.12): zλ = λ1 + (1− λ)( 1160 + 1516zλ), so that:
zλ =
16λ
1 + 15λ
≤ 16λ. (4)
Proposition 7.4. Assume J = [0, 1/4], min I = 0 and max I = 1/4. Then for λ small
enough,
zλ < xλ < yλ, (5)
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λ xλ = (1− λ) max
α∈I
(
α(yλ − xλ) + α2(zλ − xλ)
)
, (6)
λ yλ = λ+ (1− λ) min
β∈J
(
β(xλ − yλ) + β2(1− yλ)
)
. (7)
(6) expresses the fact that at (a, a′) or (b, b′), it is optimal for Player 2 to play the
pure strategy β = 0 (stay at the same location and wait until Player 1 has moved), and
Player 1 can play a pure strategy α there. Similarly, (7) expresses the fact that at (a, b′)
or (b, a′), it is optimal for Player 1 not to move. In spite of these simple intuitions, the
proof of the proposition is rather technical, and is proved separately below.
Taking for granted proposition 7.4, we now proceed to the proof of theorem 4.2. It
is simple to study the maximization problem of Player 2 given by (7), which is simply
minimizing a concave polynomial on the interval J = [0, 1/4].
If yλ−xλ ≤ 12(1−yλ), the minimum in (7) is achieved for β = yλ−xλ2(1−yλ) , and otherwise
it is achieved for β = 1
4
. Hence for λ small enough:
If yλ − xλ ≤ 1
2
(1− yλ), 4λ(1− yλ)2 = (1− λ)(yλ − xλ)2. (8)
If yλ − xλ ≥ 1
2
(1− yλ), (1− yλ)(1 + 15λ) = 4(1− λ)(yλ − xλ). (9)
Notice that the two (in)equalities of (9) imply 1 + 15λ ≥ 2(1 − λ), which is is not
possible for λ small. Consequently, for small discount factors (8) holds, and we have
proved, for λ small enough, the main equality of the proof:
4λ(1− yλ)2 = (1− λ)(yλ − xλ)2. (10)
This clearly implies:
yλ − xλ −→λ→0 0.
For each λ > 0, denote by αλ ∈ I a maximizer in the expression (6), so that
λxλ = (1− λ)αλ(yλ − xλ) + (1− λ)α2λ(zλ − xλ). (11)
And since xλ > 0, αλ > 0.
The following lemma implies part 2) of theorem 4.2.
Lemma 7.5. If 0 is an isolated point in I, then yλ and xλ converge to 0.
Proof: In this case there exists α∗ > 0 such that αλ ≥ α∗ for all λ. Passing to the
limit in (11) gives the result.
We will now prove parts 1) and 3) of the theorem. The fact that I ⊂ J gives an
advantage to Player 2, which can be quantified as follows.
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Lemma 7.6. Assume that yλn and xλn converge to v in [0, 1]. Then v ≤ 1/2, and
yλn − xλn ∼ 2
√
λn(1− v).
Proof: (1− λ)(yλ − xλ) = 2
√
λ
√
1− λ(1− yλ), so
xλ(λ+ α
2
λ) = λxλα
2
λ + (1− λ)α2λzλ + 2αλ
√
λ
√
1− λ(1− yλ) ≥ 2αλ
√
λxλ,
since λ+α2λ−2αλ
√
λ ≥ 0. Dividing by αλ
√
λ and passing to the limit gives 2(1−v) ≥ 2v,
so v ≤ 1/2, and the lemma is proved.
Consider again the concave optimization problem of Player 1 given by equation (6),
and denote by α∗(λ) = yλ−xλ
2(xλ−zλ) > 0 the argmax of the unconstrained problem if Player
1 could choose any α ≥ 0. If yλ and xλ converge to v > 0, then α∗(λ) ∼
√
λ1−v
v
, and
Player 1 would like to play in the λ-discounted game at (a, a′) some α close to
√
λ1−v
v
.
Lemma 7.7. Let λn be a vanishing sequence of discount factors such that
√
λn ∈ I for
each n. Then yλn and xλn converge to 1/2.
Proof: By considering a converging subsequence we can assume that yλn and xλn
converge to some v in [0, 1]. By the previous lemma, v ≤ 1/2, and we have to show
that v ≥ 1/2. We have for each λ in the subsequence, since Player 1 can choose to
play α =
√
λ:
λxλ ≥ (1− λ)
√
λ(yλ − xλ) + (1− λ)λ(zλ − xλ),
so
xλ(2− λ) ≥ (1− λ)zλ + (1− λ)yλ − xλ√
λ
.
By passing to the limit, we get 2v ≥ 2(1− v), and v ≥ 1/2.
Lemma 7.8. Let λn be a vanishing sequence of discount factors such that for each n,
the open interval (1
2
√
λn, 2
√
λn) does not intersect I. Then lim supn yλn ≤ 4/9.
Proof: Suppose that (up to a subsequence) xλn and yλn converges to some v ≥ 4/9.
It is enough to show that v = 4/9. We know that v ≤ 1/2 by lemma 7.6, and
since α∗(λ) ∼ √λ1−v
v
we have 1
2
√
λ ≤ α∗(λ) ≥ 2√λ for λ small in the sequence. By
assumption (1
2
√
λ, 2
√
λ) contains no point in I and the objective function of Player 1
is increasing from 0 to α∗(λ) and decreasing after α∗(λ). There are 2 possible cases:
If αλ ≤ 12
√
λ we have:
λxλ ≤ 1
2
(1− λ)
√
λ(yλ − xλ) + 1
4
(1− λ)λ(zλ − xλ).
Dividing by λ and passing to the limit gives: v ≤ 1− v − 1
4
v, i.e. v ≤ 4
9
.
Otherwise, αλ > 2
√
λ and we have:
λxλ ≤ 2(1− λ)
√
λ(yλ − xλ) + 4(1− λ)λ(zλ − xλ).
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Again, dividing by λ and passing to the limit gives: v ≤ 4(1− v)− 4v, i.e. v ≤ 4
9
.
Finally, lemma 7.7 proves part 1) of theorem 4.2, whereas lemmas 7.7 and 7.8
together imply part 3), concluding the proof of theorem 4.2.
Remarks 7.9.
• In case 3) of theorem 4.2, it is possible to show, using lemma 7.8, that lim inf xλ =
lim inf yλ = 4/9, and lim supxλ = lim sup yλ = 1/2.
• It is not difficult to adapt lemma 7.8 to show the divergence of (vλ) as soon as
J = [0, 1/4] and I satisfies:
a) there exists a sequence (λn) converging to 0 such that
√
λn ∈ I for each n, and
b) there exist η > 0 and a sequence (λn) converging to 0 such that for each n, I
does not intersect the interval [
√
λn(1− η),
√
λn(1 + η)].
• It is important for the counterexample that I = { 1
22n
, n ∈ IN∗} ∪ {0} is not
semi-algebraic. Indeed, it has been showed that if we assume X and Y finite, and the
transitions Γ, Λ and the payoff u to be definable in some o-minimal structure, then
(vλ)λ converges [Bolte et al., 2015].
7.4 Proof of proposition 7.4
We proceed in 4 steps.
1. The game at (b, a′): It is intuitively clear that yλ ≥ xλ since Player 1 is better off
when the players have different locations. We now formalize this idea. Consider the
game at (b, a′). The current payoff is 1, and Player 1 has the option not to move, so
we obtain by definition 2.12:
yλ ≥ λ+ (1− λ) min
β∈J
(βxλ + (1− β − β2)yλ + β21).
This implies
λyλ ≥ λ+ (1− λ) min
β∈J
(β(xλ − yλ) + β2(1− yλ)),
and since yλ ≤ 1, we obtain: xλ ≤ yλ. Now, minβ∈J(β(xλ − yλ) + β2(1 − yλ)) ≥
minβ∈J β(xλ − yλ) + minβ∈J β2(1− yλ) = 1/4(xλ − yλ), hence:
(1− λ)(yλ − xλ) ≥ 4λ(1− yλ). (12)
2. The game at (a, a′):
In the same spirit, in the game at (a, a′), Player 2 has the option not to move, so
we have:
xλ ≤ (1− λ) max
α∈I
(αyλ + (1− α− α2)xλ + α2zλ).
Hence,
λxλ ≤ (1− λ) max
α∈I
(α(yλ − xλ) + α2(zλ − xλ)). (13)
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Also, by definition 2.12, xλ is the value of the game (possibly played with mixed
strategies), where Player 1 chooses α in I, Player 2 chooses β in J and the payoff to
Player 1 is: (1− λ)gλ(α, β), where gλ(α, β) =
xλ((1−α−α2)(1−β−β2)+αβ)+yλ(β(1−α−α2)+α(1−β−β2))+β2(1−α2)1+α2(1−β2)zλ.
We want to prove that in this game, it is a dominant strategy for Player 2 not to move,
that is to choose β = 0. We need to show that for all α and β, gλ(α, 0) ≤ gλ(α, β). As
a function of β, gλ(α, β) can be written as a constant plus:
β(1− 2α− α2)(yλ − xλ) + β2(−(1− α− α2)xλ − αyλ + 1− α2 − α2zλ).
So we want to show that for all α in I, β in J :
(1− 2α− α2 − αβ)(yλ − xλ) + β((1− α2)(1− xλ)− α2zλ) ≥ 0
Since the expression is decreasing in α, it is enough to prove it with α = 1/4:
(7− 4β)(yλ − xλ) + β(15(1− xλ)− zλ) ≥ 0.
This is true for β = 0, and will be true for all β in J if and only if it is true for β = 1/4,
so we are left with proving:
24(yλ − xλ) + 15(1− xλ)− zλ ≥ 0. (14)
Consider λ ≤ 1/32, and recall that zλ ≤ 16λ. If xλ ≤ 1/2, then clearly (14)
holds. Assume on the contrary that xλ ≥ 1/2, then zλ ≤ xλ, and (13) gives: λxλ ≤
(1− λ)1
4
(yλ − xλ) + 0, so (yλ − xλ) ≥ 2λ and (14) holds as well.
We have shown that in the λ-discounted game at (a, a′) with λ ≤ 1/32, Player 2
has a pure dominant strategy which is β = 0. Considering a pure best reply of Player
1 against this strategy implies that the game at (a, a′) has a value in pure strategies
satisfying xλ = (1−λ) maxα∈I(αyλ+(1−α−α2)xλ+α2zλ), i.e. equation (6) is proved.
3. Small discount factors: For the sake of contradiction, assume that zλn ≥ xλn for
a vanishing sequence λn of discount factors. Then by equation (6), we have for each n:
λnxλn = (1− λn)(
1
4
(yλn − xλn) +
1
16
(zλn − xλn)).
Since zλn converges to 0, so does xλn and yλn , and moreover
yλn−xλn
λn
converges to 0.
This is in contradiction with equation (12). We have shown (5).
4. The game at (b, a′) again: We proceed as for the game at (a, a′) and will show
that in the game at (b, a′), it is a dominant strategy for Player 1 not to move. By
definition, yλ is the value of the game where Player 1 chooses α in I, Player 2 chooses
β in J and the payoff is λ+ (1− λ)hλ(α, β), with hλ(α, β) =
yλ((1−α−α2)(1−β−β2)+αβ)+xλ(β(1−α−α2)+α(1−β−β2))+β2(1−α2)1+α2(1−β2)zλ.
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We want to show that hλ(0, β) ≥ hλ(α, β) for all α and β. That is, for all α and β,
(xλ − yλ)(1− 2β − αβ − β2) + α((1− β2)(zλ − yλ)− β2) ≤ 0.
For λ small enough, we have zλ ≤ xλ ≤ yλ, and the above property is satisfied. Hence
in the game at (b, a′) it is dominant for Player 1 to choose α = 0. Consequently, Player
2 has a pure optimal strategy and we can write:
yλ = λ+ (1− λ) min
β∈J
(βxλ + (1− β − β2)yλ + β2),
proving equation (7). And the proof of proposition 7.4 is complete.
8 Appendix B: uniform analysis
To study the uniform value, we restrict the analysis to idempotent games. The exten-
sion to the general case is open.
8.1 Definition of idempotent gambling games
Definition 8.1. The gambling game is idempotent if Γ ◦ Γ = Γ and Λ ◦ Λ = Λ.
In that case, clearly Γ = Γ∞ and Λ = Λ∞, and vice versa, if Γ = Γ∞ then clearly
Γ◦Γ = Γ. Any state that could be reached in several stages can be reached immediately
in a single stage. This holds true for instance in splitting games. Notice also that for
any Γ, the multifunction Γ∞ is idempotent. If Γ◦Γ = Γ , then Γ(x) = Γ˜n(δx) = Γ∞(x)
for all n and x so if the gambling game is idempotent the notions of weak and strong
acyclicity coincide.
An immediate corollary of theorem 3.1 is the following.
Corollary 8.2. Consider a standard idempotent gambling game where a player has an
acyclic gambling house. Then {vλ} converges uniformly to the unique function v in
C(X × Y ) which is excessive, depressive and satisfies:
Q1 : ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, ∃p ∈ Γ(x), v(x, y) = v(p, y) ≤ u(p, y),
Q2 : ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, ∃q ∈ Λ(y), v(x, y) = v(x, q) ≥ u(x, q).
8.2 Definition of uniform value and optimal strategies
In repeated and stochastic games, a stronger notion of limit value is given by the
uniform value. As usual, a strategy of Player 1, resp. Player 2, is a measurable rule
giving at every stage t, as a function of past and current states, an element in Γ(xt),
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resp. of Λ(yt), where xt and yt are the states of stage t. A pair (x1, y1) of initial
states and a pair of strategies (σ, τ) naturally define a probability on the set of plays
(X × Y )∞ (with the product σ-algebra, X and Y being endowed with their Borel
σ-algebra), which expectation is written IE(x1,y1),σ,τ .
Definition 8.3. w ∈ B(X × Y ) is the uniform value of the gambling game and both
players have optimal uniform strategies if:
There exists a strategy σ of Player 1 that uniformly guarantees w: for any ε > 0,
there is N such that for any any n ≥ N and initial states (x1, y1), for any strategy τ
of Player 2, IE(x1,y1),σ,τ
(
1
n
∑n
t=1 u(xt, yt)
) ≥ w(x1, y1)− ε.
And similarly, there exists a strategy τ of Player 2 that uniformly guarantees w:
for any ε > 0, there is N such that for any n ≥ N and initial states (x1, y1), for any
strategy σ of Player 1, IE(x1,y1),σ,τ
(
1
n
∑n
t=1 u(xt, yt)
) ≤ w(x1, y1) + ε.
It is known [Sorin, 2002] that the above conditions imply similar inequalities for dis-
counted payoffs: for Player 1, the same strategy σ is such that for any ε > 0, there is
λ0 > 0 satisfying: for any λ ≤ λ0, (x1, y1) and τ ,
IE(x1,y1),σ,τ
(
λ
∞∑
t=1
(1− λ)t−1u(xt, yt)
)
≥ w(x1, y1)− ε.
And if the uniform value exists, it has to be v = limλvλ = limnvn.
8.3 Definition of adapted strategies
Our main theorem 3.1 suggests particularly interesting strategies for the players.
Consider again conditions P1 and P2, and fix a pair of states (x, y). If u(x, y) ≥ v(x, y),
the running payoff of Player 1 is at least as good as the payoff he should expect in the
long run, so we may consider that Player 1 is “quite happy” with the current situation
and in order to satisfy P1 it is enough for him not to move, i.e. to choose p = δx. If
on the contrary u(x, y) < v(x, y), Player 2 is happy with the current situation and can
choose q = δy to satisfy P2, whereas Player 1 should do something, and a possibility
is to move towards a p satisfying P1. This looks interesting for Player 1 because
if Player 2 does not react, eventually the distribution on states will approach (p, y)
and (in expectation) Player 1 will be happy again with the current situation since
u(p, y) ≥ v(p, y).
Definition 8.4. Let w in B(X × Y ).
A strategy of Player 1 is adapted to w if whenever the current state is (x, y), it
plays p ∈ Γ(x) such that w(x, y) ≤ w(p, y) ≤ u(p, y).
A strategy of Player 2 is adapted to w if whenever the current state is (x, y), it
plays q ∈ Γ(y) such that w(x, y) ≥ w(x, q) ≥ u(x, q).
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If w satisfies Q1, resp. Q2, Player 1, resp. Player 2, has a strategy adapted to w (us-
ing a measurable selection theorem [Aliprantis and Border, 2006]). If moreover w is ex-
cessive, we have w(x, y) = w(p, y) ≤ u(p, y). Mertens Zamir [Mertens and Zamir, 1971]
in repeated games with incomplete information and Oliu-Barton [Oliu-Barton, 2018] in
splitting games used similar strategies derived from the MZ-characterization instead
of the Q-characterization.
8.4 Bounded variation and existence of uniform adapted strat-
egy
In repeated games with incomplete information or in splitting games, an important
property is that any martingale on a simplex has bounded variations. This suggests
the following.
Definition 8.5. A gambling house Γ has vanishing L1-variation if for every ε > 0,
there is N such that for all n ≥ N and any sequence (pt) s.t. pt+1 ∈ Γ˜(pt), one has
1
n
∑n
t=1 dKR(pt+1, pt) ≤ ε.
The proof of the next result is inspired by Oliu-Barton [Oliu-Barton, 2018] in the
framework of splitting games. He shows that Player 1 (resp. Player 2) can uniformly
guarantee any excessive-depressive function satisfying MZ1 (resp. MZ2). Our proof
is much shorter because it uses the new Q-characterization.
Proposition 8.6. In a standard gambling game where Γ has vanishing L1-variation,
if w in B(X × Y ) is excessive-depressive and satisfies Q1, then a strategy of Player 1
adapted to w uniformly guarantees w.
Proof: Fix ε > 0. Because Lipschitz functions are dense in the set of continuous
functions, there exists K > 0 and a K-Lispchtiz function uε that is uniformly ε-close
to u. Consider w in B(X × Y ) be an excessive-depressive function satisfying Q1, let σ
be a strategy of Player 1 adapted to w and let τ be any strategy of Player 2. We fix
the initial states and write IE = IE(x1,y1),σ,τ .
Then, the average payoff of the n-stage game is:
1
n
IE
(
n∑
t=1
u(xt, yt)
)
=
1
n
IE
(
n∑
t=1
u(xt, yt)− u(xt+1, yt)
)
+
1
n
IE
(
n∑
t=1
u(xt+1, yt)
)
≥ 1
n
IE
(
n∑
t=1
uε(xt, yt)− uε(xt+1, yt)
)
− 2ε+ 1
n
IE
(
n∑
t=1
u(xt+1, yt)
)
≥ −K
n
(
n∑
t=1
dKR(pt+1, pt)
)
− 2ε+ 1
n
IE
(
n∑
t=1
u(xt+1, yt)
)
Because the gambling game is of vanishing variation, there is N such that when n ≥
N one has K
n
∑n
t=1 dKR(pt+1, pt) ≤ ε. Because ofQ1, IE(u(xt+1, yt)) ≥ IE(w(xt+1, yt)) =
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IE(w(xt, yt)). Since w is depressive, IE(w(xt, yt) ≥ IE(w(xt, yt−1)), so that IE(w(xt+1, yt)) ≥
IE(w(xt, yt−1)), and this property holds for every t. Consequently, IE(u(xt+1, yt)) ≥
IE(w(x2, y1)) = w(x1, y1). We obtain finally
1
n
IE(
∑n
t=1 u(xt, yt)) ≥ w(x1, y1)− 3ε, end-
ing the proof.
Corollary 8.7. If Γ and Λ have vanishing L1-variations then there is at most one
excessive-depressive function in B(X × Y ) satisfying Q1 and Q2.
Proof: If such a function exists, it can be guaranteed by both players. So it must be
the uniform value of the game, which is unique whenever it exists.
Combining proposition 3.3, proposition 8.6 and corollary 8.7, we obtain the exis-
tence of the uniform value in a class of gambling games:
Theorem 8.8. In a standard and idempotent gambling game where Γ and Λ have
vanishing L1-variation, the uniform value v exists, and strategies adapted to v are
uniformly optimal. Moreover, v is the unique excessive-depressive function in B(X×Y )
satisfying Q1 and Q2.
Proof: From proposition 3.3, any accumulation point of vλ satisfies P1 and P2, i.e.
Q1 and Q2, so is unique and is the uniform value, as shown above.
Observe that acyclicity is not assumed in theorem 8.8. But vanishing L1-variation
is a form of acyclicity (it rules out for example non-constant periodic orbits). A more
formal link between acyclicity and vanishing variation is given in the next section.
8.5 Bounded L2-variation and acyclicity
Definition 8.9. A gambling house Γ is of bounded L2-variation if there is C > 0 such
that for every sequences {pt} satisfying pt+1 ∈ Γ˜(pt), one has
∞∑
t=1
dKL(pt+1, pt)
2 ≤ C < +∞
For example splitting games have bounded L2-variation.
Proposition 8.10. If Γ is idempotent, non-expansive, leavable and of bounded L2-
variation, then it is strongly acyclic and has vanishing L1-variation.
Proof: Bounded L2-variation implies weak acyclicity because the real valued function:
ϕ(x) = sup
{(pt) s.t. p0=x and pt+1∈Γ˜(pt)}
∞∑
t=1
dKL(pt+1, pt)
2,
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is strictly decreasing along non-constant orbits of Γ˜ (i.e. arg maxp∈Γ(x) ϕ(p) = δx).
But for idempotent Γ, weak acyclicity and acyclicity coincide because Γ∞ = Γ. Con-
tinuity of ϕ is a consequence of non-expansivity of Γ and the fact the bound C is
uniform over the sequences {pt} satisfying pt+1 ∈ Γ˜(pt). Finally, that bounded L2-
variation implies vanishing L1-variation is a consequence of Cauchy-Schwartz inequality
( 1
n
∑n
t=1 dKL(pt+1, pt) ≤ 1√n
√∑n
t=1 dKL(pt+1, pt)
2).
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